For most US households, labor income is the most important source of wealth and housing is the most important risky asset. A natural intuition is thus that households whose incomes covary relatively strongly with housing prices should own relatively little housing. Under plausible assumptions on preferences and distributions, this result holds theoretically. Empirically, I find a significant effect: among US households, a one standard deviation increase in income-house price covariance is associated with a decrease of approximately $25,000 in the value of owner occupied housing. This empirical result implies greater cognizance of the interaction between labor income and asset risk on the part of households than suggested by most analyses of stock market behavior. The analysis also suggests that many homeowners enter financial markets in a riskier position than typically thought, and reinforces the intuitive appeal of proposals for market-or tax-based risk sharing in housing prices.
Introduction
Households' imperfect ability to trade away risk associated with labor income and housing prices complicates standard portfolio analysis. For many households, housing dominates the portfolio and future labor income is the most important component of wealth. Under these conditions, it is natural to think that risk averse households will use housing purchases to hedge income risk. This paper evaluates the intuitive notion that households whose incomes covary relatively strongly with housing prices will purchase relatively little housing.
I consider reduced housing purchases both on the extensive own-rent margin and on the intensive margin of value conditional on ownership.
A parallel literature shows that, under some conditions, investment in stocks decreases in the covariance between stock returns and labor income.
1 Formal empirical studies of investor behavior provide mixed evidence on the effect of income-stock return covariance on portfolio choice. 2 The existence of large holdings of employer stock in retirement plans suggests (but of course does not prove) that a large fraction of investors fail to recognize the importance of income-return covariance to aggregate portfolio risk.
The existing theoretical examinations of how income-return covariance affects portfolio choice assume that investors choose how much stock to own, but do not own housing. My analysis starts from the opposite assumption, which I consider a much closer approximation of reality. Kennickel, Starr-McCluer and Surette (2000) estimate, based on the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, that in 1997, 66 percent of US households owned their own home. By contrast, only 56 percent did any form of saving and just 49 percent held any stock, directly or through mutual funds or retirement plans. Among homeowners, the median home value was $100,000, whereas the median value of equities among those holding equities was $25,000.
For the large majority of households, consumption of housing and investment in housing are closely linked: ownership of rental housing is highly concentrated, so that renters typically own no housing, and homeowners typically own as much housing as they consume. Thus, unlike stock purchases, housing purchases affect utility both through the budget constraint and through direct present and future consumption benefits. Future consumption of housing
1 Viceira (2001) shows this for CRRA investors facing jointly normal stock price and wage distributions. Davis and Willen (2000) provide a similar result for CARA investors.
2 Heaton and Lucas (2000) show that in a panel of US investors, the fraction of wealth put into stocks decreases in the covariance between total income and stock market returns. However, their result appears to occur over a disproportionately old and high wealth sample and decomposing income into wage and entrepreneurial components, the estimated effect of labor income covariance is insignificant. Vissing-Jorgenson (2000) emphasizes her failure to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between portfolio weight on stocks and correlation between income and stock market returns.
2 implies that house prices affect welfare through both the numerator and denominator of future real income, a point frequently lost in the housing literature.
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To my knowledge, only three other papers consider housing choice in the context of simultaneously uncertain housing prices and labor income. Campbell and Cocco (2001) , Cocco (2000) and Yao and Zhang (2001) solve numerically for optimal lifetime mortgage and housing behavior, estimating a single population covariance matrix for prices, labor income and interest rates (and zero-covariance stocks in the case of Yao and Zhang) , and assuming jointly normal distributions. By contrast, I confine the theoretical analysis to a two period setting, but allow for population heterogeneity in the covariance between labor income and housing prices, and describe analytically conditions under which housing purchases fall with covariance. The assumptions required seem quite reasonable, but the result does not follow directly from the primitive assumption of concave utility.
Empirical evaluation of the relationship between income-price covariance and housing purchases requires data on housing investment, the joint distribution of income and prices, and variables plausibly correlated with both (I use "price" to refer to the price of housing unless otherwise noted. For empirical purposes, I use real housing prices and labor income, deflated by the US Consumer Price Index for non-housing goods). The standard approach to estimating the covariance between labor income and asset prices is to examine the comovements between prices and the incomes of a panel or repeated cross section of households.
I instead estimate the covariance between the mean wages paid by different industries at the metropolitan area (MSA) level, and MSA housing prices, and impute these estimated covariances to a large cross section of households from the 1990 US Census. Thus, for example, I obtain separate covariance estimates for retail workers and construction workers in the Boston MSA, and separate covariance estimates for retail workers in Boston and retail workers in Detroit. This approach lets me estimate covariances with local housing prices, which is important given the heterogeneity in price movements across markets. Further, it is plausible that households form estimates of income-price covariance based not on their personal histories, but rather on the experience of the industry in which they work. The cost of my approach is that job separations, geographic mobility and intraindustry differences in income movements are missed.
The equation of primary interest is a regression of the dollar value of housing owned (which takes on a value of zero for renters) on income-price covariance, expected growth 3 Sinai and Souleles (2001) emphasize renters' implicit short position in future housing prices. Similarly, young homebuyers may expect to move on to a higher quality of housing, as in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998) , so that their utility may be decreasing, rather than increasing in future prices.
3 and variance of income and prices, demographic controls, and dummy variables indicating industry (two-digit SIC code) and MSA. I also estimate separately the effect of covariance on the intensive margin of purchases conditional on owning, and on the probability of deciding to own rather than rent.
The second section of this paper presents a model of housing choice with uninsurable labor income and uncertain housing prices and lays out sufficient conditions for the result of decreasing housing purchases with increasing income-price covariance. In the case of additive mean variance preferences with no future repurchase of housing, the result holds unambiguously. The third section details the panel data on wages and prices and the crosssectional microdata on housing investment I use to estimate the effect of covariance on the value of housing owned. As expected, I find generally positive covariances, with correlations larger in the "right" industries, such as stock brokerage in New York and amusement in
Orlando. In the fourth section, I present regression results. The estimated effect of covariance on housing owned is consistently significantly negative, and using instrumental variables to overcome measurement error increases the estimated effect dramatically. Combining effects on both the extensive and intensive margins, I find that a one standard deviation increase in income-price covariance is on average associated with a reduction in the value of housing owned of approximately $25,000. This negative effect operates on both the extensive and intensive margins. The fifth section concludes with a discussion of the consequences of the results for our understanding of households' financial risk and their awareness of this risk, and for the potential gains to households from public and private sector mechanisms to offset housing risk proposed by Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) and Shiller (1993) .
Housing Choice with Stochastic Labor Income and Prices

A Two Period Model: Key Features
Present housing decisions affect lifetime utility directly through the benefits of consuming more or less housing, and indirectly through the lifetime budget constraint. I assume that housing investment and consumption are non-separable: renters' housing consumption is free to vary, but investment must equal zero; for owners, the quantity of housing owned must equal the quantity of housing consumed. 4 These constraints can be relaxed through direct or indirect ownership of rental real estate. However, the fraction of working aged households who own rental real estate either directly or through Real Estate
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How present housing investment affects the budget constraint depends on both present and future housing prices. Purchasing housing involves the sacrifice at the time of purchase of a combination of debt and equity in the amount of the (hedonic) quantity purchased times the present (hedonic) price, HP 1 . Whenever the house is resold, "period 2," absent transaction costs, today's housing investment yields HP 2 .
The date of resale is surely uncertain to homebuyers at the time of purchase. Venti and Wise (2000) show that older households appear generally to cash out only when severe financial shocks such as the need for long term healthcare arise. Presumably, in considering expected resale value, and the riskiness of resale income, homeowners weight the distribution of prices in each future state by the probability that sale will occur in that period. Because of transaction costs, homeownership is unattractive if households expect to move within a short horizon. Rather than imposing a probability distribution of moves over multiple horizons, I
will assume that all homeowners know for certain that they will resell at a future date which is fixed before housing purchases are made. In reality, habit formation and transaction costs presumably endogenize the date of resale to the housing choice problem.
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As discussed above, housing generally swamps non-housing investment in portfolios. This justifies the simplification that no other risky assets are available. Naturally, I allow homeowners to take on mortgage debt. I assume that mortgage debt is riskless both in the sense that the interest rate is deterministic and in that default is not possible. 6 With unrestricted mortgage choice, households separately choose how much housing to purchase and how much of the other good to consume in the present. This is only an approximation to reality: mortgage rates are typically lower than consumer loan rates, and households may be constrained by a debt-equity ratio.
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I do not incorporate government policy into the analysis: US households are almost universally able to avoid capital gains taxes on housing. The progressivity of taxes and Investment Trust shares is small, and the fraction of renters owning such assets is particularly small. Indirect real estate ownership through pension funds is presumably more widespread, but the exposure to local price risk likely small in most cases. 5 For example, a household purchasing a three-bedroom house today may find it more inconvenient and psychologically difficult to move to a one-bedroom apartment in retirement than would a similar couple purchasing a two-bedroom apartment today. However, the former couple might find the adjustment more worth the trouble. 6 In evaluating the effects of income-price covariance empirically, I will consider the possibility that households use present interest rates to predict future changes in income and house prices, and the possibility that comovements between labor income and housing prices are driven by comovements between labor income and interest rates. 7 Alternatively, Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2000) suggest that households may use housing purchases as a device to force themselves to save.
social insurance programs attenuate income risk, so income should be thought of as after tax and transfers. It would be interesting to extend the empirical analysis in this way. Similarly, the deductibility of mortgage interest realistically creates heterogeneity in what I assume to be a constant borrowing rate.
These assumptions allow us to confine the analysis to a two-period setting. In period 1 households earn labor income and purchase or rent housing. For households choosing to purchase, there is a simultaneous decision of how large of a mortgage M to take on.
Conditional on owning, the difference between first period income and the equity put into the home (y 1 + M − HP 1 ) goes to consumption of a composite non-housing numeraire good.
While utility is defined over housing and numeraire consumption, more intuitive analytical results can be described if choice is considered to occur over housing and mortgage debt, with numeraire consumption implicit. Renters' first period numeraire consumption is equal to first period income less rental payments. Allowing renters to borrow or lend a riskless asset would not affect the analysis.
Period 2 represents the date of both homeowner resale and lease expiration for renters.
At this time, households earn stochastic labor income, pay the principal and interest R on any mortgage taken on in the first period, take in the value of their home and allocate wealth optimally between housing and the numeraire good. This gives rise to indirect utility v.
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From a first period perspective, utility over first period housing and numeraire consumption are deterministic, but future indirect utility is stochastic, depending on the realization of period two income and housing prices. 9 I assume that first period housing decisions do not affect the realization of second period income, ignoring potential psychological benefits to homeownership.
I assume that no individual's demand affects housing prices, so that present and future prices are taken as exogenous. Although with imperfectly elastic housing supply, we would expect positive correlations between income and prices on average, as a matter of interpretation it should be emphasized that covariances are not restricted to be positive, nor need they be destructive of welfare. Indeed, renters may benefit from positive real income-price
8 This leaves open the frequently observed outcome that households never sell their homes: because I have not included transaction costs, a non-sale corresponds to purchase and resale of the same quantity of housing.
9 The chief cost of such a two period description relative to a many period model is that I am assuming a resolution of uncertainty upon resale. Incorporating continuing uncertainty might change the effect of prices on indirect utility, but the potential for added insight strikes me as small relative to the cost in complexity.
Realistically, renters' and homeowners' investment horizons are different: lease expiration is typically one year, whereas homeowners rarely sell so quickly. I take this issue up in the empirical section below.
6 correlations and homeowners from negative correlations. This may partially explain the persistent home ownership of the elderly observed by Venti and Wise (2000) and Sinai and Souleles (2001) .
In period one, households calculate expected lifetime utility under optimal behavior conditional on renting and on owning and choose the regime with the greater expected level. I consider first the utility maximization problem conditional on deciding to purchase a home.
The objects of interest here are the effect of an increase in income-price covariance Cov(P, y) on optimal housing purchases H and on expected utility conditional on owning. I consider expected utility conditional on renting later.
Homeowner Utility Maximization
Combining the assumptions above with intertemporal additivity of utility, conditional on deciding to own, expected utility is given by:
u is a concave utility function of first period numeraire and housing consumption. v is an indirect utility function, concave and increasing in second period numeraire wealth, W 2 , and nonincreasing in second period relative housing price P 2 . Z denotes household characteristics which shape preferences, and Θ is the set of relevant moments of the joint distribution of period two income and housing prices.
Defining the mortgage rate as R, second period wealth is:
The concavity assumptions imply that expected utility is maximized when housing purchases and mortgage debt satisfy the first order conditions:
Effect of increasing covariance on conditional housing purchases
Expected second period utility will, in general, depend on all the moments of the joint distribution of future housing prices and income. If we consider a change in a particular parameter of the joint distribution θ, holding characteristics Z and the rest of the moments 7 Θ constant, then we can think of the other moments as fixed parameters of the utility function. We can thus rewrite expected utility (1) conditional on Z and all of Θ except for θ as
Noting the optimality conditions:
total differentiation of the first order conditions (3) and (4) gives us two equations in two unknowns, which can be solved jointly for the change in optimal housing purchases associated with a small increase in the parameter θ. These total derivatives are given by:
Combining conditions (5) and (6), and rearranging gives the result:
The term multiplying the derivative of interest dH dθ must be positive by concavity of u and v (see, for example, Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995) , Appendix D). The second derivative U MM similarly must be negative, so dividing equation (7) by −U MM we have the relation:
Intuitively, a parameter shift tends to reduce the quantity of housing if the shift reduces the marginal benefit of housing purchases. This effect is modified by changes in mortgage debt if changes in housing investment affect the marginal benefit of mortgage debt. An induced increase (decrease) in the marginal benefit of mortgage debt tends to increase (decrease) housing purchases if increased housing investment makes mortgage debt relatively attractive. The opposite implications arise if mortgage debt becomes less attractive with housing purchase.
In our case, the distributional parameter of interest θ is the covariance between income and prices, Cov (P, y) . Equation (8) 
Additively Separable Mean Variance Utility
The first condition for housing purchases to decrease in covariance in Result 1 is satisfied under a pair of assumptions shared by Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) and Flavin and Yamashita (2001) . These papers specialize the homeowners' maximization problem by assuming that (i)
housing is purchased only once, so that expected indirect utility Ev in equation (1) depends only on the distribution of future wealth; and (ii) expected indirect utility depends only and additively on the mean and variance of second period wealth:
With wealth given by (2), and the borrowing rate R fixed between purchase and sale of housing, the variance of future wealth is given by:
In this case, an increase in covariance (holding expected income and prices constant) has no direct effect on the first period utility or on the value of expected second period wealth. Equation (8) thus reduces to:
Hence, in this setting, optimal housing purchases conditional on owning are decreasing in covariance, matching intuition. We can also see that for constant variance and mean growth in income and prices, for any positive level of housing, the variance of wealth is increasing in the covariance term. Thus, expected utility falls for any level of housing, and by implication, expected utility conditional on owning must fall.
Both mean-variance utility and the absence of future housing purchases are highly restrictive assumptions. Normality of prices and income are rejected empirically. Quadratic utility, required to guarantee mean variance preferences absent knowledge of the distribution 9 of wealth 10 implies counterintuitively increasing absolute risk aversion. More importantly, indirect utility will take the price of housing as a separate argument unless homeowners are certain that when they dispose of their home, they and the heirs they care about will be dead or in a place with uncorrelated housing prices. 
General Indirect Utility
Without the mean-variance and no future purchase of housing assumptions, an increase in the covariance between income and prices will affect the net marginal benefit of both housing and mortgage debt by changing the riskiness of future real wealth. To obtain a clear prediction on the effect on housing purchases, we must appeal to the second condition of Result 1. That is, we need to show that the marginal benefit of housing is decreasing in covariance, that the marginal benefit of housing is not decreasing in mortgage debt and that the marginal benefit of mortgage debt falls with increasing covariance. The result of monotonically decreasing housing purchases in income-price covariance can survive failure of the latter two conditions, but cannot be guaranteed without them.
Using the first order conditions (3) and (4), noting that income-price covariance has no effect on deterministic first period utility and using properties of expectations, we obtain:
To a first order, the effect of an increase in income-price covariance Cov(P, y) on the covariance between price and marginal utility of wealth, the second term on the right hand side of (10), is equal to the second derivative of indirect utility with respect to wealth, v 11 .
12 10 see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . 11 This assumption may not be too restrictive with respect to the representative stockholder.
12 To see this result, define a vector valued function of price and income, conditional on first period decisions and parameters as follows:
To a first order approximation,
; By concavity, this term is negative. This effect is intuitive: marginal utility is decreasing in labor income, so if prices are high when income is high, larger realizations of price are associated with smaller realizations of income.
The effect of a change in income-price covariance on the product of expected housing prices and expected marginal utility E(P 2 v 1 ) is more difficult to sign.
13 Expected marginal utility is typically judged to be increasing in risk 14 , so we can infer that the effect of incomeprice covariance on expected marginal utility will be positive if increasing covariance increases risk. The effect of covariance on future risk is ambiguous in general. Absent future housing purchases, an increase in covariance, conditional on positive housing purchases implies increased variance (and presumably increased risk 15 ) of future consumption, as noted above.
However, non-housing consumption decreases with housing prices if households become net purchasers of housing in the future (either through purchase of a higher quality home, or a sufficiently long planned stay in sufficiently high quality rental housing). In this event,
with additive separability in utility between housing and other consumption, an increase in income-price covariance acts to smooth marginal utility, thereby acting as a form of insurance. In the likely case that households trade up in quality in some cases, and down in others, or with strong complementarities between the two forms of consumption, the effect of covariance on risk becomes yet more difficult to evaluate.
Thus, an increase in income-price covariance has a first order negative effect on the benefit of purchasing housing by decreasing the covariance between expected prices and marginal utility. Precautionary saving motives work in the opposite direction for homeowners that can be considered to have a long position in local housing prices. A negative sign on the term U HCov(P,y) hence seems probable, but cannot be deduced from concavity alone.
13 One might consider that differences in covariance are generated by purely idiosyncratic shocks to income and housing prices, uncorrelated with the underlying distribution, so that covariance increases through the covariance in the idiosyncratic shocks. In this case, a Taylor expansion of marginal utility would show no first order effect of an increase in covariance, and a second order effect proportional to the expectation over the distribution of price and income shocks of Hv 111 + v 112 . This is qualitatively the same result as discussed in the text. More likely, differences across groups in covariances arise from differences in income and prices that are correlated with the existing distributions, calling a Taylor expansion approach into question. 14 This is a precondition for precautionary savings. Venti and Wise (2000) present evidence suggestive of precautionary motives with respect to home equity among the elderly.
15 Without knowing the distribution of income and price shocks, we cannot be certain that an increase in variance increases risk, as emphasized in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) .
Turning to equation (12), we expect intuitively that U HM should be positive: purchasing more housing should make mortgage debt more attractive. However, there is the complication that increasing mortgage debt implicitly increases first period consumption. The cross partial u 12 is difficult to sign: larger homes require more maintenance and afford more room for durable goods, but more comfortable homes might substitute for other goods.
By concavity, −P 1 u 11 is positive. Similarly, since second period prices are never negative, and v 11 is everywhere negative, the term reflecting the cross effect on second period wealth −RE(P 2 v 11 ) must be positive. Hence U HM is positive unless there are very large negative cross-consumption effects in the first period.
The term R ∂EV 1 ∂Cov (P,y) , the negative of the cross partial U MCov (P,y) , reflects precautionary motives. Again, for homeowners certainly in a long position in housing, this term is most likely positive, and U MCov(P,y) thus negative, if marginal utility is convex.
Summarizing, the second set of conditions in Result 1 for housing purchases to decrease monotonically in income-price covariance, conditional on ownership, seem likely to be met, but require assumptions on the parameters and functional form of both utility and the income and price distributions to be certain.
In the absence of future housing purchases, the increase in variance of future consumption engendered by increased income-price covariance most likely reduces expected utility conditional on home ownership, holding means constant. With large expected future housing needs, increasing covariance may act as a form of insurance, so that expected utility conditional on owning may be increasing. In this case, however, renters, who most likely hold a relatively shorter position in housing prices, presumably also benefit from the increase so that homeownership most likely remains relatively unattractive.
Renters' Expected Utility
We can think of renters as postponing the purchase of housing to a future date. At the end of a lease (typically one year, but frequently less -see US Census Bureau (1995)), renters may either rent housing again, or purchase housing. In either event, upon lease termination, present renters will have to pay for local housing services for the remainder of their stay in the same housing market. I assume that the price of housing upon lease termination is a sufficient statistic for the present value of these payments.
16 Renters' utility is thus given by:
It is natural to assume that renters' utility increases in the covariance between income and prices: when prices are high, renters face diminished utility, and thus presumably value income relatively more in such states of nature. This intuition works most clearly with the additive mean variance utility over numeraire consumption discussed above, and with second period housing needs fixed at some levelH and hence irrelevant to the maximization. Renters' second period wealth then has mean and variance given by:
In this case, the mean of second period wealth is not changed by an increase in covariance, but variance of wealth falls. Hence, renting is relatively more attractive with an increase in covariance.
Fixed future housing needs are a peculiar assumption in the context of housing choice.
The fact that renters may substitute away from housing in high price future states clouds the insurance value of renting. For example, with additive log utility over consumption and housing, covariance between income and prices can be shown to have no effect on expected utility conditional on renting, holding the rest of the income-price distribution constant. 17 With such preferences, however, utility conditional on ownership most likely falls, since real wealth presumably becomes riskier with increasing covariance between labor income and housing resale income. The important, and plausible, condition is that expected utility conditional on renting increases monotonically in covariance relative to expected utility conditional on owning.
Empirical Estimation of the Effect of Income-Price
Covariance on Housing Demand
Equations to be estimated
The theoretical discussion suggests that we should observe empirically a relationship between covariance and housing purchases as depicted in Figure 1 . The covariance between income 17 In this case, expected utility conditional on renting is
This implies constant expenditures on housing and expected second period utility is E(log(y 2 ) − log(P 2 )), which does not change with covariance. It is interesting to note that households are risk seeking in the price level, and risk neutral with respect to log prices in this case.
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and prices, Cov(P,y) is measured on the horizontal axis; optimal housing purchases conditional on covariance (H*, represented by the thick line) and maximized utility conditional on owning (U|Own) or renting (U|Rent) are measured vertically. Housing purchases are shown to decrease in covariance (the intensive margin) to a critical level Cov*, above which a combination of the risk conditional on owning and the low consumption of housing implies greater expected utility conditional on renting (the extensive margin). Naturally, such a relationship will be conditional on covariates. This pattern of homeownership appears quite plausible theoretically, but because the results are not unambiguous, we cannot interpret an empirical test of the model as a test of rational investor behavior. Rather, we are jointly testing that the model presented has some application to risk as perceived by households and that households act on this risk. Such a figure suggests estimation of the effects of increasing covariance on the extensive margin, the intensive margin, and the combined effect on both margins:
Here Z is a set of observable characteristics potentially correlated with demand for housing consumption or investment, Cov(P, y) is the covariance between income and price levels, OW N indicates home ownership and represents idiosyncratic household tastes for housing consumption and investment. In equation (15), VALUE is a variable which takes on the value of a household's home if it is owner-occupied, or zero if the household rents. In the conditional regression (14), VALUE|OWN is the value of a homeowner's house.
Whether we confine analysis to the intensive margin, or consider the intensive and extensive margins simultaneously, we cannot interpret the estimated coefficient on covariance as the effect of covariance on desired investment. Desired investment in housing is unobservable. What we do observe is optimal investment subject to the constraints that owner occupiers' investment must equal consumption 18 and that renters may not own any housing.
It is possible that some households would desire negative investment in housing without the constraints, and that the zero value assigned to renters is a form of censoring, but confining the sample to owner occupiers does not overcome the failure to observe desired investment.
Estimating the effect of covariance on either the intensive or extensive margin alone involves technical and data problems. A probit with the instrumental variables and fixed effects required for identification is computationally infeasible. I thus present a linear probability model in the extensive margin equation (13). In the absence of fixed effects and instruments, unreported probit and linear probability estimates are virtually identical. On the intensive margin (equation (14)), there is concern that high covariance households who choose to own may have unobservably large taste for owner occupied housing .
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I will thus focus on estimating the combined equation (15), but present estimates of the effect of covariance on the intensive and extensive margins separately. I regard as unrealistic the assumptions required to convert an estimate of b 1 or β 1 into a parameter of risk aversion, or cognizance of risk. However, assuming Z includes any demand characteristics plausibly correlated with income-price covariance, a significantly negative estimated value of β 1 implies 18 As noted above, failure to observe rental holdings impacts only a small fraction of non-landlord working age heads of households. 19 A Heckman sample selection approach is indicated, but requires either normality of errors or an exogenous shifter of housing tenure choice uncorrelated with demand conditional on ownership. A theoretically plausible candidate, mean length of time in the same residence by MSA-SIC cell, appears to meet neither criterion.
that portfolio considerations do enter housing demand, and that, on average, households consider covariance between income and prices to augment the riskiness of homeownership.
The estimated coefficient on covariance also informs whether joint income-price risk creates a distortion worthy of intervention.
Theoretically, both short and long term covariances should be considered as factors in housing purchases, as potential renters must consider the joint distribution of income and rents between lease signing and termination, typically one year. By contrast, homeowners have much smaller annual moving probabilities. However, since we do not know the actual horizon which homeowners use to consider risk, and because short and long term covariances are highly correlated, I will restrict myself to consideration of a single covariance, choosing five years as a reasonably long horizon which does not sacrifice too many observations with limited panel price and income data. 
Estimating the income-price variance-covariance matrix
The covariance Cov(P, y) must be estimated. To do so, I assume that real log labor income and housing prices follow AR(1) processes:
Here, g y and g h are mean growth rates of income and housing prices and yt and ht are deviations from mean growth in year t.
The covariance between the level of income and prices between years t and t+5 is thus the product of period t income and price times the estimated covariance of percent (approximately log) changes. If we observed housing choice and income in period 1, we would calculate: The interaction of income and log change covariances and variances to create level covariance and variance measures is notationally unpleasant. This problem cannot be overcome by estimating equations (13) through (15) in log form. The equation of primary focus (15) includes a dependent variable that takes on zero values, and covariance itself may be zero or negative. In the tables of results, I label Cov(P, y) by COV(P,y) and σ hy by COV(lnP,lny).
In the model, P 1 is an hedonic price. For estimation purposes, I make the strong assumption that this price is equal (and normalized to $1) for all households in all areas, so that the observed dollar value of housing is assumed equal to the hedonic quantity H. By including metropolitan area fixed effects (and interactions with income) in my regressions,
I overcome some of the attendant problems. Because housing demand is likely nonlinear in price, this is an imperfect fix. However, the alternative of estimating different hedonic prices for separate housing markets would be highly suspect. With the assumption on hedonic prices, my estimate of the covariance between income and price levels is thus the product of income and the covariance of income and price shocks:
Similarly,V ar(P ) =σ 
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I deflate both income and house prices by the US consumer price index for all non-housing goods, so that variances, covariances and growth rates are in real terms. Local price indices are available, but less reliable than the national index.
The income and price innovations y and h are somewhat predictable based on lagged changes and current economic conditions, particularly interest rates. In some specifications, I take out the components of the 's that are predictable based on interest rates, and I obtain almost identical results, as I do in unreported specifications removing the estimated effect of lagged shocks. In the former case, I regress log changes in price and income on lagged interest rates, and then estimate the covariance of the residuals. In this setting, I do not consider it appropriate to differentiate between economy-wide shocks and industry-specific shocks: this would be appropriate only if households held risk-minimizing positions in some regional index. I do, however, estimate the covariance between the wages of each MSA-SIC cell and aggregate MSA wages. This statistic may relate to the economic integration of local industry with their local economies, which might correlate with geographic integration and hence employee housing prices.
I estimate expected log price and income growth, the variance of y , the variance of h and the covariance σ hy as means within MSA-SIC cells:
23 Splitting the sample, I find that the effect of covariance on younger households' purchases is slightly greater in magnitude than the same effect for older households. 24 The repeat sale methodology is meant to yield an index of prices for units of comparable quality:
renovations and depreciation are not observed, and may bias the index.
Because I have overlapping five year changes, I estimate standard errors for the covariance estimates following Newey and West (1987) , assuming a five year lag.
Variance-Covariance Results
Aggregate variance and covariance statistics are reported in Table 1 . These statistics arise from a merge of the variance-covariance estimates with income, industry and MSA data from the 1990 US Census one percent metropolitan sample. The census population I consider consists of household heads with positive labor income, no retirement income and identifiable MSA and SIC categories for which time series data was available both from the OFHEO house price and BLS wage series. These limitations leave me with just over 300,000 observations in 6,241 MSA-SIC cells.
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The mean variance of log income growth (VAR(lny)) is approximately 0.9 percent, relative to mean growth (GROW(y)) of approximately 4.0 percent. Mean variance of housing prices (VAR(lnP)) is 3.7 percent, around a mean five year growth GROW(P) 4.7 percent. The mean log covariance (COV(lnP,lny)) is 0.5 percent, associated with a mean correlation CORR of 0.32. There is considerable variation in the magnitude of covariance, and approximately one quarter of household heads work in industries with negative income-price covariances.
The variance of house prices must be multiplied by the value of housing squared to obtain the contribution of price variance to the variance of wealth. Assuming a fairly small $100,000 house, the standard deviation of wealth attributable to housing wealth alone, at the mean variance level of 3.7 percent is approximately $19,000. However, the contribution of price variance to income variance is overstated when repurchase is ignored. 26 The mean level of income variance suffers from measurement error in both income and estimated variance of income, and from the skewness of the income distribution, which bias the mean upward.
On the other hand, the level of variance of income five years from today is just a fraction of the variance of lifetime income, because income is variable in intervening years, and because the level of income in five years informs all future earnings. Further, household 25 To avoid nearly singular matrices, I also eliminate industries which never have more than 200 observations in any MSA. 26 Further, to the extent that homeowners can "time the market," variance in prices may not be entirely bad.
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incomes only imperfectly track industry incomes: idiosyncratic shocks to individual income will increase the variance attributable to income. The mean standard deviation of income is 2,729. With a reasonably large multiplier on annual income, the contribution to variance is thus potentially greater than that of housing price variance. The mean income-price correlation of 0.32 indicates that covariance contributes meaningfully to financial risk and this correlation is presumably biased to zero by measurement error.
COV(lny M , y) is the interaction of household head income and the covariance between log growth between cell wages and mean wages in the workers' MSA. BETA(S,y) is the covariance between stock market returns (from CRSP's value weighted index) and cell income divided by the variance of stock market returns. BETA(R,y) is the analogous measure for nominal interest rates. Notably, the stock beta measure is on average positive and significantly different from zero for more than half of the cells observed. This stands in contrast to the results of Davis and Willen (2000) . The failure of that paper to find significant occupationstock market covariances may be due to small samples or short horizon, and hence noisy (see Griliches and Hausman (1986) ) estimation.
In stark contrast to the existing literature on housing and risk, I find similarly significant 
Cross Sectional Homeownership and Demographics Data
In addition to the imputed variance -covariance and income variables, I observe, at the household level, housing tenure, the estimated value of owner occupied homes and standard demographic correlates with housing demand from Census microdata. These variables, describing the household heads' wage income, age, sex, race, family size and education are summarized in While the level of asset wealth is not identified in the Census, total investment income is. Table 3 suggests that the assumption that only housing and debt are held is not a bad approximation for the households in question, although it must be noted that Kennickel et al. (2000) show that a majority of stock ownership is in the form of retirement plans. The almost complete absence of asset income among renters is particularly striking, and suggests that housing is, indeed, the dominant asset for US households. While approximately two-thirds of households own housing, less than one-third have any investment income. Mean investment income is approximately two percent of mean home value among owners, and accounts for approximately one and one-half mean month's rent for renters. Investment income is highly skewed in the population: median investment income is just $30 for owners and zero for renters. There is some evidence of precautionary savings in the sample population: an unreported regression of investment income on characteristics and on industry variance of mean wages yields a significant and positive relationship.
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Identification and Inference
A natural concern in estimating equation (15) is that the covariance between income and prices may be correlated with other demand factors. I control directly for the variables commonly thought to influence housing consumption and investment decisions described above and summarized in Table 2 and for dummies indicating marital status, both directly and interacted with income. These are similar to the regressors used in, for example, Ioannides and Rosenthal (1994), but I include income interactions and exclude some within-MSA geographic controls which are likely endogenous.
Both housing investment and income-price covariance can be expected to be correlated with the mean growth and variance of income and prices, (and their interaction), discussed above and summarized in Table 1 . I control for these variables as well as for MSA-SIC cell fixed effects, and interactions between income and a set of MSA and SIC dummy variables.
The cell fixed effects remove the effect of the covariance between log income and house price shocks (COV(lnP,lny)), and the variance of income shocks. However, the covariance between prices and income is equal to the product of income and these shocks, and the variance of income is equal to the variance of the shocks times income squared, as shown above. Thus, income variance and income-price covariance levels are only partly captured by the MSA and SIC interactions with income.
Some of the effect of income-price covariance on housing investment may stem from correlation with unobserved higher moments of the income distribution interacted with other moments of the price distribution. Such concerns can be allayed somewhat by instrumenting for covariance with the interaction of income and the correlation between income and prices, which removes the scaling by variances. This approach is also attractive given measurement error in covariance. Income-price covariance may also be correlated with the covariance between wages and mortgage rates or stock market returns discussed above, in that all of these variables indicate cyclical earnings. Households may be able to save around predictable price and income shocks, and thus I control for BETA(R,y), BETA(S,y) and COV(y M ,y), discussed above and summarized in Table 1 .
We might be concerned about selection: households who wish to purchase a large quantity of housing might choose occupations with low wage-price covariances. However, either direction of causality is consistent with household-level belief that increasing covariance increases homeowners' exposure to risk, and action upon that belief, and these are the objects of present interest.
Measurement error presents a major challenge. Income and cell level covariance of log income and price shocks are estimated with both conceptual and observational error. Con-22 ceptual error arises in income because Census reported income is not equal to income in the year of housing purchase. Observationally, reported income is known to be a noisy measure of present income.
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There is considerable conceptual error in the covariance estimates when applied to household heads. Individuals' income changes do not track industry mean wage changes both because of occupational mobility and because of different wage structures within industries.
In general, this conceptual error cannot be considered noise with a mean of zero. Coefficient estimates must be taken as the effect of industry level covariance, rather than true covariance on individual housing choice. Thus, even if we assumed a utility function, recovering any underlying parameters would require a model of how individual income is linked to industry mean wages. Also, estimating covariances for all households based on the period 1975 to 1999 misses the fact that different covariances will apply to different households depending on the year of their purchase and their resale horizon. It is encouraging in this regard that covariances estimated in the first half of the time series are highly correlated with covariances using the second half. Finally, household heads' labor may not be the dominant source of some households' income.
Observationally, the log income-price shock covariance σ hy is measured with significant error. I estimate a mean standard error of the covariance estimates of 0.02, considerably greater than the mean estimate of covariance of 0.005. The mean ratio of the absolute value of covariance to the standard deviation of the estimate is just 0.36. A particular source of concern is outliers. While 98 percent of observations have estimated σ hy values less than 0.025, the maximal value is approximately 10 times this amount in magnitude, and the minimal value three times.
Interacting noisy covariance measures with income subject to reporting error can be expected to compound the problem of measurement error. If we interact observed σ hy with noisily observed income, denoting by u measurement error in income and by v error in the covariance estimate, we obtain:Ĉ
ov(P, y) =ŷσ hy = (y + u)(σ hy + v).
This object has a potentially very small signal to noise ratio, so that we expect considerable attenuation bias in OLS estimation. Assuming that true covariance is uncorrelated with income, and that the errors in each are uncorrelated, the signal to noise ratio of any particular observation should be increasing in the estimated variance of the error V ar(v) in 27 See, for example, Bound and Krueger (1991) . There is also spousal income to consider -alternative specifications with covariances calculated as within-household weighted averages yield similar results, but cloud the interpretation of cell or SIC fixed effects.
measuring σ hy , but weighting by an estimate of this variance will not eliminate attenuation bias.
28
A more promising approach to measurement error is to use alternative measures of covariance as instruments. In general, if we can find a yσ hy interaction measured with error orthogonal to that in the base estimate, then the IV estimate will not suffer from observational attenuation bias. A more likely outcome is that the instrument's errors will be partially correlated with the error in the original estimate. In this case, IV estimates can be expected to have some, but less bias than OLS estimates. A technique attributed to Wald (1940) is to use the sample rank of a mismeasured variable as an instrument. I present results with such an instrument, along with results using ranks of alternative measures of the covariance. I use the covariance between income and price changes, with shocks purged of components predictable based on interest rates (COV(P,y)|R) (the "interest rate adjusted" covariance, as opposed to the "standard" covariance) and the correlation measure
, both interacted with income as instruments for COV(P,y). In the tables, rX denotes the rank of variable X.
To be explicit, the two stage IV estimator of β 1 in equation 15 comes from the equationŝ
Here, rCOV represents the rank of the possibly alternative measure of COV(P,y). Z includes the demographic and variance-covariance measures discussed above.
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To get an idea of the importance of the IV approach, I estimate an OLS regression of the
In the event that the innovation covariance σ hy has a greater signal to noise ratio than the covariance product yσ hy , it is tempting to divide the relationship V ALUE = β 0 +β 1 (yσ hy )+β 2 Z by y, and consider the effect of the innovation covariance on the fraction of income spent on housing. I present such a regression, and find, not surprisingly, that standard errors are so large as to render almost all regressors insignificant.
This approach also has the disadvantage of ruling out cell fixed effects. 29 In undertaking such an approach, we have the opposite of the standard "weak instruments" problem:
we do not want instruments to be too highly correlated with estimated covariance. Direct use of alternative measures implies sharing all of the time series error in income, and a large part of the observational error in the covariance of income and price shocks. We can expect the estimated rank of covariance, or the rank of alternative measures to be less strongly correlated both with true covariance and with the error term. An open question is, given a set of instruments measured with error, and only correlations observable, what is the best combination of instruments. With a large sample, we presumably value consistency over efficiency in the first stage, so that a comparatively small first stage R-squared is desirable.
24
where CELL ms indicates working in MSA m in industry s.
We expect COV(P,y) to be highly correlated with the product of education and the income-stock price beta, but expect attenuation bias in OLS estimates. Using the rank rCOV(P,y) as an instrument for covariance yields an estimate of η 1 almost 100 times larger than the OLS estimate using uninstrumented COV(P,y). This is a striking increase, but not terribly surprising given the very large measurement error noted above.
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Results
Effect of Covariance on Housing Purchases Combining the Extensive and Intensive Margins
The object of primary interest is the effect of income-price covariance COV(P,y) on the value of housing owned VALUE. The additional right hand side control variables labeled Z in equation (15) are the demographic and variance-covariance variables discussed above and summarized in Tables 1 and 2 . with age and family size exerting significant positive effects on value, and a dummy variable for black household heads having a significant negative effect both in level and interacted with income. Column (2) incorporates the variance-covariance variables, both in levels and interacted with income. Most noteworthy, income-price covariance COV(P,y) has a significant negative effect. Log covariance COV(lnP,lny) also has a significantly negative effect.
Mean income and price growth predictably increase housing purchases. Notably, VAR(y) has a significant positive effect, consistent with a precautionary investment demand for housing. Column (3) illustrates the difficulty of dividing the expected relationship through by income. Whereas almost all of the demographic variables have significant effects on the level of housing, only the black indicator, income squared and education have significant effects on VALUE/y. The coefficient of interest in this case is on COV(P,y)/y, which is equal to COV(lnP,lny). The estimated coefficient is negative but insignificant. In all cases, the standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and allow for clustering at the MSA-SIC cell level. The heteroskedasticity control is important given the expected nonlinear relationship 30 Relating to the discussion in the footnote above, instrumenting with rank gives a first stage R-squared of .48. Instrumenting with the interest rate adjusted COV(P,y)|R, the first stage is stronger, with an R-squared of .72, but the IV estimate is still 10 times smaller than the estimate using rank.
between housing purchases and covariance, and because purchases are bounded below at zero. Given the attenuation bias expected due to measurement error, I defer interpretation of magnitudes to the IV estimates.
I add MSA-SIC cell fixed effects and interactions of MSA and SIC dummies with income to the OLS estimates in Table 5 . The presence of cell fixed effects implies that all log variances and covariances, common to all workers in any particular cell disappear from the analysis. Further, the income × MSA interaction absorbs income times growth and variance of income. Column (1) reports an OLS regression with no weights, and column (2) weights observations by the inverse of the estimated standard error of COV(lnP,lny). Column (3) replaces the standard covariance estimate with the interest rate adjusted covariance measure COV(P,y)|R. In all specifications, income price covariance has a negative and significant effect on VALUE, although smaller in magnitude than without fixed effects. The comparable results in columns (1) and (3) show that there is no significant difference in the coefficients on the alternative estimates of covariance.
Tables 6 and 7 present first and second stage instrumental variables regressions of the form described in equations (16) and (17). In all cases, we find that COV(P,y) has a negative effect on the value of owned housing, significantly larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate.
In each table, Column (1) uses the rank of the standard covariance measure, rCOV(P,y) as an instrument for the level of COV(P,y). Column (2) uses the rank of the interest rate adjusted covariance, rCOV(P,y)|R, and columns (3) and (4) (5) and (6) in the second stage Table 7 , I confine analysis only to the 10 largest MSAs, and instrument for each remaining MSA-income interaction with its rank in column (6) . Column (5) is presented as a comparison, and reveals that instrumenting for the MSA-income instruments reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on COV(P,y), but not quite significantly.
Given measurement error, the result that instrumenting increases the magnitude of the coefficient estimate on almost every instrumented variable is expected. Most notably, in Table 7 the estimated coefficient β 1 on COV(P,y) increases approximately by ten to twenty times over the OLS estimates in Table 5 . Given the significant negative coefficient on the interaction of variance of income and variance of prices VAR(P)VAR(y), instrumenting with the rank of the interaction between income and variance-scaled correlation, rINC*CORR appears appropriate. This instrument is less likely to be correlated with variances and higher moments of the joint income-price distribution that might be correlated with optimal housing purchases than the level of covariance is, because of the scaling. Estimates using this instrument for COV(P,y) appear in columns (4) through (6) of Table 7 . At the cost of lost cross sectional observations, using the ten largest MSAs likely reduces any measurement error surviving the IV strategy, since mean wages are measured with larger samples in the panel data from which variance and covariance measures are obtained. In sum, the estimated coefficient on COV(P,y) of -54, obtained in column (4) without instrumenting for MSA × income interactions, and in column (6) with the reduced sample, and instrumenting for these interactions seems to be a more plausible estimate than the larger coefficients estimated without instrumenting for other income and variance-covariance variables, as in columns (1) through (3). In all cases, the first stage instrument is highly significant and the R 2 statistic is large.
To interpret this coefficient, multiplying -54 by the standard deviation of COV(P,y), which is 453, implies that a one standard deviation increase in income-price covariance is associated with a decrease in housing purchases of approximately $25,000. Alternatively, holding income constant, the standard deviation of log covariance COV(lnP,lny) is 0.009.
Multiplying a one standard deviation increase in this variable by the estimated coefficient implies that housing purchases would decrease by approximately 49 percent of a year's wages.
Neither effect is large relative to the very large standard deviation of VALUE, but both clearly have economic significance. Table 8 presents OLS and IV estimates of the effect of income-price covariance on housing purchases conditional on homeownership. The dependent variable VALUE|OWN is equal to the value of owner occupied housing, and the sample is confined to owner-occupiers.
Effect of Covariance on Housing Purchases Conditional on Homeownership
Given that we have the "selection" equation reported below: OW N = F (COV (P, y), Z, ),
we expect that holding characteristics and other variance-covariance elements Z constant, households with large covariance values who own will have positive idiosyncratic taste for owner occupied housing . In this event, absent an instrument correlated with the tenure decision to own or rent housing, but uncorrelated with taste for housing conditional on ownership, we expect estimation results to understate the effect of covariance on conditional housing purchases. It should be emphasized again that even with a sample selection mechanism, the conditional regression fails to estimate the effect of covariance on desired investment in housing. Rather, it estimates the effect on optimal investment subject to the housing investment equals housing consumption constraint. I do not see this as an inherently more interesting effect than the effect on optimal investment subject to either the investment equals consumption constraint or the zero investment conditional on renting constraint. The latter effect was estimated in Tables 4, 5 and 7. The conditional coefficient is interesting in that a significant coefficient indicates that consumption is effected directly by the portfolio consideration, not just through the portfolio (as could be consistent with an effect only on the extensive margin).
Column (1) of Table 8 presents the OLS estimate of the effect of COV(P,y), demographics and other variance-covariance terms on VALUE|OWN. COV(P,y) has a negative, but insignificant effect in the OLS specification. Column (2) presents the result with covariance estimated by the rank of the interaction of income with income-price correlation, rINC*CORR. Again, as expected, the IV approach reduces attenuation bias. I obtain an estimated effect of approximately -59 dollars per unit of covariance, statistically indistinguishable from the comparable estimate in column (4) of Table 7 . Hence, we expect housing purchases to fall by the same figure of approximately $25,000 estimated on the combined margin with a one standard deviation increase in covariance. Table 9 Presents OLS and IV estimates of the effect of covariance of shocks COV(lnP,lny) on the probability of ownership. I divide covariance by income in this case, because the fraction of income devoted to housing, not the level seems most likely to determine ownership.
Effect of Covariance on Tenure Choice
In the absence of fixed effects, unreported linear probability and probit specifications give approximately identical results, which provides some confidence in the fixed effects case.
In specifications (1) and (2), I include MSA and SIC dummy variables, but not interacted with income. Column (1) is an OLS estimate, and column (2) presents IV results where COV(lnP,lny) is instrumented with the rank of the income-price correlation, rCORR. The 31 Using income interacted with mean length in the same residence by MSA-SIC cell as an "exogenous" selection variable generates an increase in the estimated coefficient on COV(P,y), but the increase is small relative to the increase generated by instrumenting to overcome measurement error. Further, a negative effect of this interaction in the conditional regression is significant, but the positive effect on selection is not.
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OLS and IV coefficient estimates are both negative, but not neither is significantly different from zero.
Conclusions
Because housing is the most important asset, and labor income the most important source of wealth for most households, we expect intuitively that housing decisions will incorporate the desire to hedge against income risk. Putting some theoretical structure on the question of housing choice with risky prices and income, under what look like reasonable conditions, I find that households optimally purchase less housing on both the intensive and extensive margins as the covariance between housing prices and labor income increases. This theoretical prediction is borne out empirically. I estimate that, on average, an increase of one standard deviation in covariance reduces housing investment by approximately $25,000. It is clear that this effect operates on the intensive margin. On the extensive margin, covariance has a negative effect on the probability of ownership, but significance cannot be established.
An implication is that uninsurable labor income and housing prices, combined with nondiversification of housing investment, act to distort consumption and investment decisions substantially. The results are interesting both because they extend our understanding of household financial risk and because they suggest that households are, on average, aware of these risks and take some measures to reduce risk.
Existing studies of stock market behavior present ambiguous evidence that households act on labor income -asset return covariance. The result of Heaton and Lucas (2000) leaves open the possibility that only relatively astute entrepreneurs take covariance into account.
Significantly, I find in separate, unreported regressions that the result of decreasing housing purchases in income -house price covariance extends both to college graduates and household heads with no college experience. This suggests that some degree of financial sophistication extends to the broader public.
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The theoretical and empirical results are interesting with respect to stock market behavior. Because homeowners are wealthier on average than renters, financial assets are concentrated in the hands of homeowners. On average, the incomes of these homeowners covary positively with housing prices. For homeowners considering the purchase of stock, there is thus background risk from income, from housing returns, and from the typically 32 On the extensive margin, I find a significant effect only for college graduates, and only an insignificant effect among non-college heads. We might expect the less educated household heads to be more likely to face liquidity constraints that would complicate the covariance effect analysis. Hence, we cannot be certain that the difference on the extensive margin is driven by differences in financial sophistication.
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positive covariance of the two risks. Over long horizons, I find a positive correlation not only between stock market returns and labor income, but also between stock market returns and housing prices. The consequences for risk aversion over stock returns, and the welfare consequences of incremental investment in equities are worthy of further consideration.
Karl Case, Robert Shiller and Allan Weiss have proposed 33 that derivatives markets in regional housing prices might offset risk attributable to variability in capital gains on housing investment. Evidently, if households completely insured against house price risk through such markets, there would be no incentive to shift housing consumption or investment with changes in income-price covariance. While the general equilibrium welfare effects of the introduction of such markets are ambiguous, the analysis suggests that such securities, if fairly priced, would have direct benefits for many households. Indeed, given the large average correlation found between income and prices, it appears that households might wish to hold short positions in regional price indices to smooth labor income across states of nature, independent of desire to smooth capital gains.
As a practical matter, most households directly hold few or zero non-housing assets, so that complete insurance against housing risk seems highly unlikely for most of the population.
Given this, and in light of the analysis presented here, proposals to remove the exemption of imputed rental services and the virtual exemption of capital gains on housing from taxation warrants further consideration. Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) emphasize the attendant implicit risk sharing in housing prices. Assuming strictly positive nominal price changes (and no offsetting reduction in income taxes), a tax at rate τ on housing capital gains would proportionately reduce the covariance between income and prices for homeowners, and should hence proportionately reduce the substantial consumption and investment distortion estimated above. Again, the general equilibrium welfare consequences are uncertain, but we might expect the presence of income-price covariance to augment the positive effects found by Berkovec and Fullerton. Heterogeneity in income-price covariances across households can be expected to complicate any such analysis.
33 As in Shiller (1993) . Interations of income with marital status dummies are included, but not reported. Also included are MSA × SIC cell fixed effects, and MSA and SIC × income interactions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, Column (2) weights by the inverse standard error of the log income-price covariance measure. In Column (3), the standard covariance measure is replaced by the interest rate adjusted measure. 
